Intersubjectivity and the concept of embodied consciousness in neurophilosophy

This article analyzes intersubjectivity as a constitutive property of embodied consciousness, the biological substrate of which is formed by mechanisms of shared (common) action, as brain systems (in particular, the mirror neuron system) provide a common neural code for the perception and execution of actions. The author assumes a fundamental, constitutive relationship between the ideas of intersubjectivity and embodiment, which manifests itself at the phenomenological, cognitive, and neurobiological levels. Intersubjectivity is viewed as an epistemological and ontological possibility of consciousness, challenging traditional views of knowledge as objective and independent of the knower, as it emphasizes the role of social interaction and communication in shaping experience and understanding of the world. Applying the concept of affordance in the context of 4E cognition allows demonstrating that perception, cognition, and consciousness depend on the body and its interaction with the world. That is, the body and world are not external conditions for consciousness, but rather constitute its foundation, as the body is a participant in experience, actively shaping and organizing the processes of cognition and perception, and not merely an instrument used for cognition. The methodological basis of this study is the theoretical synthesis of the idea of embodied cognition and intersubjectivity in the context of modern neurophilosophy, which involves the use of methods of philosophical hermeneutics and conceptual analysis. From this perspective, consciousness and the body cannot be separated, and cognition is not a matter of abstract symbolic manipulation. Consciousness is embodied, meaning its activity is based on the dialectical relationship between a person's sensory and motor experiences and their corporeality. Mental representations are not abstract or independent of the body but are closely linked to bodily experience. They are shaped by affordances, or possibilities for action, offered by objects and situations. Therefore, a person's perception of the world depends on their ability to act within it. On this basis, it is concluded that intentionality in the dynamics of relationships between people and their environment in the formation of cognitive processes is characterized by a willingness to use the possibilities of action, where affordances appear as an ecological niche reflecting the special form of life of a particular organism.