In a famous 1962 book, the historian Macpherson coined the expression « possessive individualism » to characterize classical liberalism. In this paper, I will present a critique of Macpherson and show how a very different version of liberal individualism emerged in the Anglophone world in the 19th century under the influence of the post-Kantian notion of Bildung. I will show how liberalism evolved from an atomistic and a-social view of the Self and of « negative » freedom as « freedom from » to a developmental and historical conception and to « positive » freedom as « freedom to » (Green T. H., 1881). Such a view finds its fullest expression in John Stuart Mill’s conception of self-development and individuality « as one of the leading essentials of well-being » and as « the chief ingredient of individual and social progress » (On Liberty, 1859). I will then describe how this vision has been the inspiration of the « new » social liberalism of the 20th century and has led, for instance, to John Dewey’s vision of liberal individualism (1893) and to John Rawls’s critique of utilitarianism (1971, 1999). Amartya Sen’s capability approach focuses too on development and agency as constituents of individual wellbeing (Sen A., 2009). The notion of Bildung is thus central for understanding the liberal concept of the Self not in terms of « having », but of « being », as the young Marx would have said.
Cathérine Audard (Wed,) studied this question.