Confiscation as Governance in the Ottoman Empire, 1750–1839

Abstract Müsadere, the confiscation of the estates of dismissed or deceased officials in the Ottoman Empire, has been viewed as a marker of despotism, an impediment to capitalism, a legitimate form of punishment, and a useful fiscal and political instrument. However, beyond case studies, the empire-wide logic and dynamics behind this practice remain elusive. Using both qualitative evidence and a rich dataset of confiscation attempts informed by a historically-informed interpretative scheme, this article examines the dynamics that shaped the enforcement of müsadere and their broader implications. Focusing on the period from 1750 to 1839, which was marked by an unprecedented surge in confiscations amid wars, fiscal crises, and tensions with regional intermediaries, it shows that calculations of cost and benefit, the bargaining power of families, and competition among rival factions shaped the enforcement of müsadere. It also makes a broader argument that in an era of increased dependence on intermediaries, often interpreted as one of decentralization, the imperial government used these confiscations as a selective mechanism of governance to discipline its agents, redistribute offices and resources, and recalibrate centre–periphery relations without jeopardizing essential alliances. Viewed comparatively, the Ottoman experience reflects an organizational trade-off faced by early modern polities in managing the risks of delegated authority. It demonstrates how an early modern polity could tolerate, negotiate, or even rely on forms of inherited or appropriated office, while simultaneously reclaiming public resources, typically seen as two opposing paths of state formation.