Social Choices: Why They End Up Being Institutional and Why They Cannot Be Reduced to the Sum of Individual Decisions

This paper develops a structural critique of social choice theory by arguing that collective decisions cannot be derived from the aggregation of individual preferences, even when interpersonal comparisons are allowed. Building on a critical reading of Arrow, Bergson–Samuelson, and Amartya Sen, the paper shows that attempts to overcome impossibility results merely shift the problem from the axiomatic to the normative and institutional domain. The analysis demonstrates that once interpersonal comparability is introduced, no unique solution exists, and social outcomes depend on prior shared normative criteria, ethical weights, and the definition of the feasible choice set. Since values are not traded in markets, these elements cannot emerge from isolated individuals but require historically constituted institutional frameworks. The paper further argues that the cognitive and informational demands implied by individual-based social choice models are unrealistically high, exceeding not only real individual capacities but also those of a hypothetical central planner. As a result, a positive theory of social choice grounded in individuals is not operationally viable. In response, the paper proposes an institutionalist interpretation consistent with the Philosophy of Belonging, according to which social belonging precedes individual freedom both ontologically and historically. Social choices are thus understood as institutional processes that reduce complexity, stabilize expectations, and enable coordinated action under uncertainty. Individual freedom and creativity are preserved as marginal but essential sources of innovation and social change, whose effectiveness depends on institutional frameworks that channel and integrate them.