Debates about fundamentality typically ask which entities, properties, or structures are ontologically basic. This paper argues that the question has been mis-specified. Any such account presupposes that entities persist as identifiable units under transformation. This presupposition is rarely examined. We shift the question: not what is fundamental, but what must hold for any reality in which entities can be distinguished, identified, and tracked at all — whether or not persistence is assumed. From minimal structural conditions — distinguishability, real transformation, and the possibility of identity continuity — we derive necessary constraints on any admissible domain of reality. These constraints include restricted transformation structure, finite integration capacity, and bounded identity drift. The derivation follows from the formal structure of the persistence condition (La Profilée, Papers 80 v3 and 103 v2). The result is a structural notion of fundamentality: not as a class of entities, but as the set of conditions that cannot be removed without eliminating the possibility of persistence itself. Fundamentality is therefore not a competing ontological category but the structural precondition any ontological category must satisfy.
Building similarity graph...
Analyzing shared references across papers
Loading...
Marc Maibom
Building similarity graph...
Analyzing shared references across papers
Loading...
Marc Maibom (Tue,) studied this question.
www.synapsesocial.com/papers/69fbef86164b5133a91a3713 — DOI: https://doi.org/10.5281/zenodo.20041447
Synapse has enriched 5 closely related papers on similar clinical questions. Consider them for comparative context: