A Second‐Order Moral Twin‐Earth

ABSTRACT How to understand metaphysical disputes is a disputed matter. Within this broader dispute, deflationist approaches read some of the traditional metaphysical debates as having metalinguistic negotiations at their roots. That is, some metaphysical disagreements are read as speakers commending each other to use some concepts over others. Thomasson's Easy Ontology exemplifies this view. In this paper, I introduce the Second‐Order Moral Twin‐Earth SOMTE, a thought experiment designed to test whether such a deflationist strategy can account for disputes about metanormative realism. I argue that SOMTE shows two patently disagreeing positions within this debate whose incompatibility can't be properly characterised by this deflationist treatment. Given the commitments of the metanormative positions in dispute, I show that the strategy of translating the metaphysical disagreement into metalinguistic disputes proves unavailable. I conclude that SOMTE poses a challenge to the adequacy of this deflationist treatment in the metanormative domain.