Abstract It is common to find in the literature on natural language semantics reference to the “Frege-Strawson” theory of presuppositions and the “Frege-Strawson” theory of definite descriptions. While these labels might be useful in certain contexts, I argue that the differences between the Fregean and the Strawsonian theories of presupposition are sufficiently important to warrant separate treatment. In the first part of the paper, I consider Frege’s and Strawson’s views on presuppositions, focusing on those triggered by definite descriptions. Next, I propose a formulation of the two theories within a framework for natural language semantics inspired in Kaplan (1989), to which a Montague-style apparatus for semantic composition is added. I argue that Frege’s and Strawson’s respective views of presuppositions should be formally implemented as partial functions situated at different levels within this semantic framework. This offers good reasons for a negative answer to the question in the title. In the second part of the paper, I compare the predictions the two theories make for the case of definite descriptions. I argue that embeddings of definite descriptions in intensional contexts show that the Fregean theory is the more promising alternative for the presuppositions that these expressions trigger.
Andrei Moldovan (Fri,) studied this question.