This paper argues that Charles Darwin, Richard Dawkins, and the Austrian economists Carl Menger, Ludwig von Mises, and F.A. Hayek independently solved the same fundamental problem: explaining complex functional order without invoking a designer. The Darwinian solution rejected teleology and group-level explanations in favor of gene-level selection and extended phenotypes. The Austrian solution rejected constructivist rationalism and state design in favor of spontaneous order emerging from individual action. I argue that these are not mere analogies but structurally identical solutions to formally equivalent problems. The convergence reveals a deep theoretical unity with profound implications for institutional analysis. Specifically, Dawkins's concept of the extended phenotype completes Hayek's concept of extended order by providing the missing mechanistic foundation: legal institutions are extended phenotypes of competing legal memes. This synthesis undermines both multilevel selection theory in biology and constructivism in social science, as both reintroduce the teleological errors their respective traditions sought to eliminate. The paper concludes by outlining implications for constitutional political economy and institutional design.
Ignacio Adrian Lerer (Mon,) studied this question.