Abstract Preconflict material, social, ideological, and organizational foundations are seen as central to sustaining the insurgencies of the 20th and 21st centuries. These endowments help to explain how some insurgents survive the early onslaught of stronger counterinsurgents. Still, while endowments may be central to attracting followers and building legitimacy, they do not necessarily help insurgents fight better. Military practitioners and scholars of state militaries often view such preconflict foundations as challenges to military effectiveness that organizations must overcome. This article considers the role of rebels’ preconflict foundations through the lens of the Taliban’s revival after 2001 and via cross-national analysis of the association between preconflict foundations, insurgent military capacity, and insurgent victory since 1946. I find little evidence that endowments generate military power. In fact, there is evidence that, in some circumstances, ideological, social, and organizational foundations may have the opposite effect. In the case of the Taliban, its preconflict endowments interfered with military reform and adaptation and the social cohesion they generated often led to worse combat outcomes.
Alec Worsnop (Tue,) studied this question.