Flying Ad Hoc Networks (FANETs) formed by cooperative Unmanned Aerial Vehicles (UAVs) require formally proven secure and resource-efficient authentication because open wireless channels allow active adversaries to inject commands, replay traffic, and impersonate nodes. Conventional certificate-based mechanisms impose key management overhead and remain vulnerable under device capture, while existing lightweight and Physical Unclonable Function (PUF)-assisted proposals commonly assume stable connectivity, lack formal adversarial verification, or are evaluated only through simulation. This paper presents a lightweight PUF-assisted authentication protocol designed for dynamic multi-hop FANET operation. The scheme provides mutual UAV–Ground Station (GS) authentication and session key establishment and further enables secure UAV–UAV communication using an off-path ticket mechanism that eliminates continuous infrastructure dependence. The protocol is constructed through verification-driven refinement and formally analysed under the Dolev–Yao model, establishing authentication and session key secrecy and resistance to replay and impersonation attacks. Implementation-oriented latency measurements on Raspberry-Pi-class embedded platforms demonstrate that cryptographic processing time can be further reduced with hardware improvements, while the overall end-to-end delay is still largely determined by channel conditions and connection behaviour. Comparative evaluation shows reduced communication cost and broader security coverage relative to existing UAV authentication schemes, indicating practical deployability in large-scale FANET environments.
Sen et al. (Thu,) studied this question.