At the critical juncture where Chinese cities are transitioning toward intensive urban renewal and sustainable development, the revitalization and adaptive reuse of industrial heritage face a collective action dilemma stemming from the misaligned interests among three key stakeholders: the Local Government (LG), the Industrial Heritage Developer (IHD), and the Neighboring Complementary Merchants (NCMs). To address this challenge, this study constructs a tripartite evolutionary game model and innovatively proposes an analytical framework of a Multi-Dimensional Policy Lever System, which integrates spatial synergy (k, w, v), economic incentives (p1, p2, q), and behavioral regulation (m, n). Numerical simulations reveal that the successful regeneration of industrial heritage does not rely on any single policy but fundamentally depends on the systematic coordination and dynamic adaptation of these three-dimensional levers. The nonlinear coupling of spatial elements forms the foundation for value leapfrogging. The economic driving force requires a critical shift from government subsidies (p) towards a market-based value capture and recycling mechanism (q). Behavioral interventions provide the necessary cognitive and normative safeguards for cooperation. The research elucidates a three-phase evolutionary pattern of the system, transitioning from a stalemate to synergy, and emphasizes the need for an adaptive and sequential combination of policies. The theoretical contribution of this study lies in providing an integrative quantitative analytical framework. Its practical significance is to offer a scientific basis for decision-makers to construct a dynamic policy toolbox and promote the sustainable collaborative governance of industrial heritage.
Chen et al. (Sat,) studied this question.