Body Integrity Dysphoria (BID), despite its statistical rarity and apparent oddity, raises fundamental questions about dignity, autonomy, and moral responsibility that concern all individuals. This paper examines whether abstention—refusing to intervene for BID—is morally preferable to active intervention, by drawing a parallel with Medical Assistance in Dying (MAiD). Drawing from contemporary ethical debates on the permissibility of passive versus active euthanasia, the paper develops a philosophical argument comparing BID surgery to active euthanasia and the refusal of BID surgery to passive euthanasia. It applies the distinction between experiential and critical interests, as well as the role of available life paths in shaping well-being and personal narratives, to explore how moral responsibility should be understood in cases of BID. What is argued is that abstention is not neutrality but a form of action that carries the same moral weight as intervention while often being disguised as inaction. Both BID surgery and its refusal involve harm, but refusal unjustifiably prolongs suffering and erodes dignity. Respecting the wishes of individuals with BID is therefore not only a matter of clinical practice but also a test of whether dignity and autonomy are treated as universal values rather than selectively granted privileges.
Leandro Loriga (Mon,) studied this question.