Verifiable Differential Privacy Partial Disclosure for IoT with Stateless k-Use Tokens

Internet of Things (IoT) applications often require only minimal necessary information—such as threshold judgments, binning, or prefixes—yet they must control privacy leakage arising from multi-round and cross-entity access without exposing raw values. Existing solutions, however, frequently rely on ciphertext structures and server-side states, making it difficult to define a leakage upper bound for restricted answers in the sense of Differential Privacy (DP), or they lack unified information budgeting and k-use control. To address these challenges, this paper proposes a verifiable differential privacy partial disclosure scheme for IoT. We employ DP accounting to uniformly constrain the leakage of three types of operators: threshold, binning, and prefix. Furthermore, we design stateless k-use tokens based on Verifiable Random Functions (VRFs) and chained receipts to generate publicly verifiable compliance evidence for each response. We implemented an end-edge-cloud prototype system and evaluated its performance on two use cases: smart meter threshold alarms and industrial sensor out-of-bound detection. Experimental results demonstrate that compared with a baseline relying on server-state counting for k-use control, our stateless k-use mechanism improves throughput by approximately 25–37% under concurrency scales of 1, 8, and 16, and reduces p95 latency by an average of 15%. Meanwhile, in multi-party splicing attack experiments, the re-identification accuracy remains stable in the 0.50–0.52 range, approximating random guessing. These results validate that the proposed scheme possesses low-energy engineering feasibility and audit-friendliness while effectively suppressing splicing risks.