A longstanding debate in philosophy of medicine—whether disease concepts are value-free (naturalism) or value-laden (normativism)—intersects with broader discussions about patient autonomy and the move away from paternalistic practices. An important argument supporting naturalism is the idea that value-freedom is necessary to protect patient autonomy. This paper challenges that view, arguing that autonomy does not require value-freedom. We first demonstrate that prominent theories of personal autonomy do not demand value-freedom but rather a responsible way of dealing with normative judgements. Drawing on parallels to debates on values in science, we distill three strategies for managing non-epistemic values responsibly: transparency, value diversity, and prioritization of appropriate values. Applying these strategies to medicine, we illustrate how value-ladenness can align with patient autonomy when managed appropriately. • Patient autonomy is sometimes argued to require value-free medical information and disease concepts. • We argue that autonomy does not require value-freedom but adequate management of values. • Parallel issues about autonomy arise in the debate on values in science. • Strategies for value management in both contexts are transparency, diversity, and value aptness.
Bueter et al. (Wed,) studied this question.