Animal rights have emerged as a major issue in modern moral philosophy, upending long-held beliefs about human superiority and moral exclusivity. The ethical validity of human activities that have an increasing impact on the lives of non-human animals through industrial farming, scientific research, and environmental degradation necessitates careful philosophical examination. By analyzing important philosophical arguments, such as utilitarian, rights-based, and anti-anthropocentric viewpoints, this essay reexamines the idea of animal rights. It makes the case that animals have moral relevance based on their ability to suffer and their intrinsic worth as living things, and that it is both morally and philosophically imperative that humans reconsider their moral obligations to animals. This paper offers a philosophical reflection on animal rights by examining key moral arguments, historical perspectives, and ongoing debates. It argues that a coherent ethical framework must recognize animals as morally significant beings and challenge deeply entrenched anthropocentric assumptions.
Sabina Jesmin (Sun,) studied this question.