This study challenges the conventional explanations for the failure of Türkiye’s ambitious 21 billion Peace Water Pipeline Project (1986–1995) by demonstrating that technological disruption, rather than geopolitical obstacles, fundamentally undermined this transboundary water initiative. While traditional analyses emphasize political tensions, our research reveals that the concurrent rapid advancement of desalination technology decisively altered the strategic calculus of potential recipient nations, particularly Gulf Cooperation Council countries. Through a comparative case study analysis of Saudi Arabia and the UAE from 1985–1995, we document how these nations systematically rejected pipeline dependence in favor of a domestic desalination capacity that offered superior strategic autonomy, cost competitiveness, and operational flexibility. The study demonstrates that desalination technology improvements during this critical decade—including energy consumption reductions from 20–25 kWh/m 3 to 8–12 kWh/m 3 for reverse osmosis systems and production cost declines from 2. 50–3. 50/m 3 to 1. 00–1. 50/m 3 —made domestic water production economically viable while eliminating dependencies inherent in transboundary pipeline projects. Our analysis reveals that Gulf states were willing to pay significant “sovereignty premiums” for water independence, gaining complete control over supply security and protection from political manipulation of water access. The findings contribute to a broader understanding of how technological innovation functions as an independent agent in international resource diplomacy, reshaping cooperative frameworks more decisively than traditional diplomatic negotiations. This case illuminates critical lessons for contemporary water security challenges, demonstrating how emerging technologies can rapidly obsolete large-scale infrastructure projects during their planning phases.
Sakamoto et al. (Fri,) studied this question.