In the last US National Security Strategy, President Trump clearly outlined the return of the Monroe Doctrine for Latin America. The 1823 Monroe Doctrine, now updated by the so-called Trump Corollary, claimed that the Western Hemisphere belonged to the US as its own backyard and that no foreign power, particularly a European one, should be involved in the region. Today, the recipient of the Doctrine is clearly China, which is the leading trading partner of several Latin American countries. Since January 20, 2025, the Trump administration evidently brought its almost bipolar competition with China to the Western Hemisphere. Nevertheless, although US alignment has become a must for the region’s widespread conservative forces, Washington has not stopped China’s advancement in Latin America. Tariffs and interventionism motivated Latin America to continue diversifying away from Washington, widening foreign policy portfolios to encompass the rest of the Global South. Two elements must be highlighted in the consequences of US-Latin America relations under Trump 2.0. First, Venezuela, the principal target of the current US foreign policy, is not the only country looking to Global South partners to counter Washington. Even Trump-loyal governments are building ties with Global South peers to reduce their dependence on an unpredictable White House. Secondly, China is currently an affirmed regional partner. Trump’s objective of expelling the Asian giant from Latin America, without providing a feasible alternative, can prove wrong. In other words, the Chinese presence in Latin America relates to its gargantuan infrastructure investments, as seen with the Chancay Port in Peru. Hence, threatening with tariffs, visa bans, and other sanctions without offering economic projects at Chinese rates does not in any way enhance the US image. Nonetheless, this analysis is not homogeneous across Latin America. Economies that are more dependent on the US and less aligned with Trump’s political ideology seem to reward Washington’s hawkish stance toward China. Mexico, tied to North America through the USMCA, increased import tariffs on Chinese products, generating diplomatic tensions with Beijing in an attempt to appease the Trump administration amid disputes over fentanyl, migration, and the supposed Mexican backdoor for Asian goods to enter the US market (Dussel Peters, 2025). El Salvador and Honduras are similar examples. The Bukele government encountered appeasement from Trump due to its permission to deport Venezuelan migrants to El Salvador’s CECOT mega-prison, which not only deleted any possible US criticism of its human rights violations, but also led to a bilateral economic agreement promising investments in the Central American nation. Regarding Honduras, a country where 26 % of the GDP depends on migrants’ remittances primarily from the US (IOM, 2024), Trump’s interference in the last controversial presidential elections showed again the vulnerability of countries economically dependent on Washington. In fact, by pardoning Juan Orlando Hernández, the former Honduran president convicted of drug trafficking in the US, Trump furthered the popularity of right-wing candidate Nasry Afura, who claimed to have won the presidency despite broad denunciation of fraud. However, some Latin American nations that have long depended on the US reacted differently to Trump’s foreign policy. The most spectacular cases are Lula’s Brazil and Petro’s Colombia.
Alberto Maresca (Thu,) studied this question.