ABSTRACT Background Pain perception is a conscious experience, but neither pain nor consciousness is defined in the developing human fetus. Emergent consciousness may be regarded as a phenomenon that ultimately arises from an essential minimum of functional neuronal connectivity. Proposed U.S. federal legislation asserts that a functioning cerebral cortex is not necessary to experience pain. Methods We assess the scientific premise of the 13 assertions in the “Pain‐Capable Unborn Child Protection Act” with analysis and interpretation from a developmental neuroscience perspective. We review the biological requisites of fetal sentience, the emergence of involuntary spinal cord and brainstem reflexes, the early appearance of autonomic homeostatic stress reactions, and measures of synaptogenesis and neuronal connectivity through immunocytochemistry and fetal functional neuroimaging. Results The formation of functional synapses can be demonstrated by synaptophysin immunoreactivity in the receptive sensory layers of fetal cerebral cortex at around 25 weeks' gestation, but immunoreactivity is not uniformly intense until after 35 weeks. In vivo, fetal functional magnetic resonance imaging confirms immunocytochemical results by showing complex, interconnected brain networks developing at similar gestational ages. Fetal magnetoencephalography detects magnetic fields from fetal brain activity and demonstrates second‐order rule learning in fetuses over 35 weeks' gestation. The neural pathways required for the emotional and evaluative aspects of pain processing in the brain are still incomplete in term newborns. Conclusion Given the limitations of reductionism to explain the subjective nature of consciousness, evidence from developmental neuroanatomy, neurophysiology, and functional neuroimaging infers that fetal pain perception requires the emergence of conscious cortical processing beginning with weak functional thalamocortical connectivity well after the age of fetal viability.
Graf et al. (Wed,) studied this question.