Analysing Public Food Procurement Effectiveness in India and Implications for Food Security

ABSTRACT There appears to be limited theoretical understanding of the mechanisms through which process, performance and agency‐related variables interact to influence procurement effectiveness in India. In addition, limited research exists on how farmer‐producers perceive the role of such factors in the public procurement of food and whether bottom‐up scenario‐based planning can suggest measures for increasing procurement effectiveness. Therefore, using an innovative framework linking process, performance and agency‐related variables to procurement fidelity (a measure of procurement effectiveness), the research question that this article answers is: How do process, agency and performance‐related variables influence the effectiveness of public food procurement in India? This question was answered by analysing two crucial cases of Indian procurement agencies using data collected via scenario‐based focus group discussions with 86 farmer‐producers across five Indian states. The key theoretical takeaways of this article are that three types of malfeasant behaviour (rent‐seeking, discretion, collusion) among a wide range of intermediaries and procurement officials lead to process variation in food procurement. Process variation leads to performance variation, which in turn affects procurement effectiveness. This article argues that ineffective public food procurement affects food security by analysing the links between food procurement and four dimensions of food security (availability, access, utilisation and stability). A key empirical takeaway is that farmer‐producers advocate bottom‐up planning as an antidote for increased food procurement effectiveness and food security in the country.