At the heart of Habermas’ formal pragmatics and his understanding of modernity lies the imperative for intersubjectivity, which shapes his approach to democracy. However, instead of speculating about some of his theoretical proposals, in order to strengthen his theory of modern democracy, Habermas integrates deliberative democracy into his wider theory strategically rather than reflexively that ought to provide theoretical and practical consolidation. This is justified by his theoretical commitment to grounding modernity in the conditions of intersubjective communication. To demonstrate this, I deconstruct Habermas’ key theoretical propositions through the perspective of intersubjectivity, identifying three idealized models: the public sphere, discourse ethics, and universal pragmatics, that serve as a foundation for his democratic theory. This way, I aim to appoint to certain “blind spots” in Habermas’ philosophy, points of theoretical tension that, rather than being resolved, appear to intensify when his theory enters the domain of practical discourse, especially in relation to the transnational model of deliberative democracy.
Vanja Grujić (Wed,) studied this question.