International organisations rely on institutional decision-making capabilities in order to function, however these mechanisms often struggle due to differing national interests. This thesis examines the European Union’s response to the Russo-Ukrainian war as a case study to understand how consensus and unity is achieved during security crises. By using a Neoliberal Institutionalist framework, the thesis’ objective is to examine the mechanisms which allowed the EU to bridge the gap between political will and technical ability. This qualitative desk study utilises official legal documents from the Council as well as parliament voting records in order to analyse the shift from crisis response to long-term security strategy. The findings show that while issues regarding energy dependence on Russia and neutrality caused division, the Union successfully managed dissent through institutional flexibility. The thesis identifies mechanisms such as the Silent Procedure, Constructive Abstention, and the European Peace Facility as important tools for the EU to bypass deadlock. Moreover, the analysis shows that voting behaviour amongst members of the European Parliament was primarily driven by ideology rather than nationality. Conclusively, by using the EU and the Ukrainian conflict as the case study, this study shows how international institutions with diverse members can manage internal divisions.
Björkman et al. (Thu,) studied this question.