Abstract Despite their increasing deployment worldwide, behavioral interventions—frequently referred to as nudges—remain ill-defined. Thaler and Sunstein’s original definition has been more honored in the breach than the observance, not only by its authors but also by much of the expansive literature that followed. Exasperated by the ongoing proliferation of nudge usages, behavioral public policy (BPP) researchers have offered substitute or complementary terms that have experienced varying degrees of adoption but ultimately only increased BPP’s conceptual confusion. So much so, in fact, that one leading scholar has recently advocated abandoning such definitions altogether. The popularity of the nudge terminology is unlikely to abate any time soon, however, and clear definitions are necessary for coherent usage and analysis. Therefore, this paper advances a better definition that detaches nudges from their convoluted libertarian paternalistic origins. This straightforward, descriptive, definition offers conceptual clarity and a more functional basis for the systematic analysis and implementation of actual behavioral interventions. It does so by emphasizing what differentiates nudges from all other interventions—namely, that they appear primarily to use behavioral processes to advance their policy goals. This definition sharply distinguishes nudges from other regulatory interventions, even when the latter are non-coercive (like traditional information disclosures) or behaviorally informed (e.g., “sin” taxes). By delineating nudges based exclusively on their behavioral mechanisms, this definition also highlights what unifies them as a distinct instrument class, irrespective of nudges’ diverse policy goals and regardless of whether they comport with or violate any normative standard.
Avishalom Tor (Wed,) studied this question.