Editorial: Populism and trust: an unbreakable binomial?

The Plague, the War, the AI: Theorizing Populist Mistrust Amidst PolycrisisIn 2021, leading political scientist and expert on populism Cas Mudde argued that the recent pandemic had "created a welcome shift away from identity and security politics and has put some of the key institutions of European progressive politics back in a positive light, notably the EU and the national state" (Mudde 2021). Less than five years later, however, the prospects of a "World without Right-Wing Populism and Nationalism" seem slim and are increasingly receding.At least in the medium term, the "rally 'round the flag" effect of COVID has not only waned but, in many societies fractured by widening ideological, social, and political divides, has even been reversed. To the disruptive aftereffects of "the Plague"-one might be tempted to speak of a "political long COVID"-is currently added the impact of "the War." The Russian-Ukrainian conflict and its global repercussions continue to place significant strain on numerous societies. This strain is not limited to the direct consequences of the conflict-such as rising energy prices or increased military spending that detracts from other budgets -but also stems from the deepening divides between pacifists, interventionists, pro-Russians, pro-Ukrainians, the West, the Rest, other loosely defined poles, and the many nuanced positions in between.If Russia epitomizes and actively promotes a fundamental distrust of Western liberal democraciesdescribed as an "empire of lies" in Vladimir Putin's speech of 24 February 2022-the rising relevance and assertiveness of non-liberal or illiberal political models introduces further challenges. China is the most prominent of these alternatives, but societies such as the UAE, Singapore, and Hungary, with all their differences, could also be cited as competing models. Not coincidentally, HORIZON Europe now calls for renewed reflection on the "autocratic appeal" and strategies to confront it (HORIZON 2025). In the Western hemisphere, radical populist parties, movements, and leaders-especially on the right-are gaining influence in large and significant states, from the United States to Italy and Argentina. Even within consolidated European democracies such as Germany, the United Kingdom, and the Nordic countries, right-wing parties employing populist narratives have become, or are becoming, serious contenders for power.A further (and perhaps final) element now forcefully entering the picture is Artificial Intelligence-"the Robot." Once again, citizens are confronted with doubts that they might turn out to be "nothing but a piano key" (to borrow the elegant Dostoevsky quote that opens Pavel Dufek and Adam Ruzicka's contribution to this volume). The resulting image is one of ordinary citizens rendered superfluous, interchangeable, and easy to spook and manipulate in a labyrinth of bots and deepfakes. Regardless of whether AI truly holds the potential to substitute for millions of jobs -as advertised-this narrative represents yet another affront to the dignity and self-understanding of the working class and the "meaning of work" (see Sandel 2020), as well as a convenient justification for layoffs in a time of economic straits.Against this backdrop, we are pleased to present this special issue of Frontiers in Political Science, which brings together both empirical and theoretical studies of populism. While Augustin Espinosa et al, as well as Anna Marino and Sara De Athouguia Filipe, offer empirically grounded analyses within robust theoretical frameworks, Jonas Jakobsen's article and Dufek and Ruzicka's theoretical interventions remain highly attentive to empirical realities and implications in turn.The contribution by Augustin Espinosa et al. may be read not only as an introduction to this special issue but also as an accessible presentation of the question of populism more broadly. The authors summarize the three main theoretical approaches-ideational, discursive, and political-strategicbefore examining citizens' views of democracy and populism in the Peruvian context. Their sociological and anthropological study produces nuanced and compelling results, including citizen conceptions of populism that do not always align with academic typologies, as they note. Their reflections on the ambiguities and dynamics of populist politics hold relevance far beyond Latin America, a region often regarded as both a cradle and laboratory of populism.Anna Marino and Sara De Athouguia Filipe connect the central theme of this issue-distrust-with an analysis of nostalgia in three Southern European countries: Spain, Portugal, and Italy. By examining the electoral manifestos of four Radical Populist Parties (RPPs), they show how these political actors mobilize narratives of "the good old times" and idealized national identities, contrasted with portrayals of decline precipitated by immigrants and progressive forces. These findings are particularly relevant for countries with the highest median ages in Europe (although, for the sake of precision, Italy was slightly surpassed by Slovakia and Greece, at least at the time of the European Commission's 2023 report). They also resonate with the long and often uneasy transition of former colonial powers into "PIIGS" countries whose socio-economic models are facing sever obstacles and radical critiques. The article sheds light not only on the self-representation of these RPPs but also on the identities they seek to project outward.Dufek and Ruzicka, as noted, offer a sophisticated diagnosis of the "relational pathologies" that fuel populist reactions and are, in turn, exacerbated by them. They pair this analysis with an intriguing theory of commitment that helps explain some of the seemingly irrational or extreme behaviors displayed by populist parties and leaders-and why such behavior can signal trustworthiness to certain constituencies. Their contribution provides a profound interpretation of populism as a quasi-desperate response to the "abyss of meaninglessness" opened wide by recent social transformations. They also connect this reading to an understanding of populism as a reaction to the "broken promises of democracy" (an interpretation I embraced myself in Mazzola 2021).Finally, Jonas Jakobsen approaches the subject of populist distrust from a deliberative perspective. In a courageous and well-argued response to Habermas, he contends that "contempt" is neither entirely justified nor foreseeably effective as a reaction to populist strategies. With an intervention highly relevant to political dynamics in the Nordic countries and Germany-though not at all limited to them-Jakobsen highlights the pitfalls of a "militant democratic" confrontation with populism on the one hand and offers a set of realistic alternatives on the other, sketching what he terms an "ethos of engagement".To sum up the empirical and theoretical contributions of this special issue: Espinosa et al. have offered an updated review of the relationship between populism and democracy within the Peruvian context: it effectively summarizes and sophisticatedly challenges simplistic applications of academic theoretical frameworks. Marino and De Athouguia provide a classicqualitative and interpretive -analysis of populist discourses in Southern European countries by focusing on a dimension which as the same time crucial and underexplored: nostalgia. Dufek and Ruzicka mobilize a refined theory of commitment to cast light on fundamental sociopsychological components of the populist attempted reaction to powerlessness and dehumanization. Jakobsen turns some of the presuppositions of Habermasian theory against Habermas' own conclusions to draw practical implications on the current dilemma of whether -and how -to respond to populist movements.Thus, all and each one of the authors contribute to advancing populist studies thematically, methodologically, or both. Insofar as the phenomena and problems considered are trans and internationals -and the authors' perspectives suffice to show that they are -these studies hold also clear relevance for the understanding of populist dynamics in international relations.In warmly thanking all the authors for allowing us to gather their excellent work, I am joined by the coeditor Federica Liveriero, and thank her as well for her precious editorial work. While it would be an overstatement to claim that these diverse perspectives and methodologies are entirely harmonic-nor was such convergence expected or required-it is indeed clear that they speak meaningfully and profoundly to one another. Even more importantly, each in their own way offers an attentive and original examination of a topic of urgent relevance: in the contexts they analyze, and far beyond.