This paper argues that public-sector unionization constitutes a category error in democratic governance when collective bargaining is exercised through the withdrawal of compulsory public services. Focusing on K-12 education as a paradigmatic case, it shows that teacher strikes operate through asymmetric coercive leverage: children are legally compelled to attend school, families cannot meaningfully exit, and the costs of labor disputes are externalized onto dependent third parties rather than borne by the negotiating agents themselves. Under these conditions, service withdrawal functions not as ordinary labor pressure but as a form of structural hostage-taking, independent of intent or moral self-conception. The argument is grounded in the Authority Magnifies Burden (AMB) principle, which holds that increased authority over dependent parties amplifies—not diminishes—the moral obligations governing its exercise. Applying AMB, the paper demonstrates that public unions differ categorically from private unions: the state cannot coherently negotiate with itself by permitting its agents to impose harm on those they are fiduciarily bound to serve. Drawing on continuity-critical public functions—including the military as a limiting case—the paper argues that democratic legitimacy requires a strict prohibition on public-sector collective bargaining through service withdrawal, not as a denial of worker rights, but as a constraint on state self-coercion. Fair compensation, representation, and due process remain obligations of the state; collective withdrawal as leverage does not. Finally, the paper shows how moralized language surrounding care, service, and "acting for the children" produces a moral inversion in which the justificatory burden is displaced away from authority and onto its victims. Prohibiting public-sector unions is therefore not a policy preference but a necessary condition for preserving democratic legitimacy under compulsory dependency.
Michael P Mellette (Sat,) studied this question.