Abstract How—and with whom—do rulers share power? Existing research focuses on the strategic logic of powersharing. In this paper, we analyze its economic foundations. Powersharing is modeled as a subnational fiscal contract, in which rulers allocate political representation based on constituencies’ revenue potential. Empirically, we combine historical geospatial data on different types of primary commodity production—mineral point resources and diffuse smallholder cash crop agriculture—with the ethnic affiliation of cabinet ministers across 15 African countries. We find that cash crop groups are overrepresented in post‐independence cabinets, while mining or food crop production does not translate into higher shares of power. Consistent with a revenue bargaining framework, we find that rulers traded political representation and targeted public services for indirect taxation of cash crops. Overall, this suggests powersharing serves not only as a means to distribute resources and co‐opt potential challengers but also to expand the pie and the rents at the ruler's disposal.
Pengl et al. (Wed,) studied this question.