Democratic Backsliding and Executive Power Consolidation: A Comparative Study of Nigeria and Hungary (2010–2024)

This study examines democratic backsliding and executive power consolidation in Nigeria and Hungary between 2010 and 2024 within a comparative analytical framework. Drawing on democratic theory and contemporary scholarship on executive aggrandizement, the research investigates how elected governments expand authority while maintaining formal democratic structures. A mixed-methods design was adopted, integrating qualitative data from 20 purposively selected experts and quantitative longitudinal data from the Varieties of Democracy Institute, Freedom House, and the Economist Intelligence Unit Democracy Index. Descriptive findings indicate a grand mean of 3.78 (SD = 1.09), reflecting moderate-to-high perceived democratic erosion across rule of law, media freedom, legislative autonomy, civil society space, and electoral integrity. Media freedom recorded the highest perceived decline (M = 3.88), followed by executive-legislative imbalance (M = 3.82). Multiple regression analysis demonstrates that executive dominance significantly predicts democratic health (R² = 0.677; F = 23.450; p < 0.001), explaining 67.7% of variance in institutional performance. Judiciary independence emerged as the strongest negative predictor (B = –0.420; p = 0.001), followed by media freedom (B = –0.390; p = 0.002), legislative independence (B = –0.350; p = 0.006), and electoral effectiveness (B = –0.280; p = 0.036). The findings reveal convergent patterns of institutional weakening despite contextual differences: Hungary’s consolidation was largely constitutional and formalized, while Nigeria’s was more incremental and politically negotiated. The study concludes that executive power concentration is a principal driver of democratic backsliding and underscores the necessity of reinforcing institutional safeguards to enhance democratic resilience.