Abstract This paper examines the potential for the forced reutilization of Russian state propaganda narratives by Ukrainian counter-propaganda during the ongoing war initiated by the Russian Federation against Ukraine. The analysis, conducted using methodological approaches including the Theory of Inventive Problem Solving (TRIZ) and related analytical frameworks, identifies a previously underexplored element: the possibility of placing inscriptions on the surfaces of Ukrainian strike unmanned aerial vehicles (UAVs). These inscriptions could reproduce slogans previously disseminated by official Russian propaganda that have since become discredited in the information space and are gradually being abandoned by Russian state media due to their evident inconsistency or demonstrable falsehood. One such slogan is the claim that “the special military operation is proceeding according to plan.” The study also notes the advisability of avoiding slogans that are explicitly associated with Ukraine. Such an approach may redirect the subconscious aggression of the Russian population—intensified by successful Ukrainian strikes against Russian military infrastructure—not toward Ukraine or the Ukrainian Armed Forces, but toward the Russian political regime that for years promoted the slogans now appearing on Ukrainian UAVs. The current attempts by Russian authorities to remove these slogans from the public discourse may further intensify cognitive dissonance among Russian citizens who have been directly or indirectly affected by Ukrainian strikes, as each such strike may serve as a reminder of long-standing propaganda narratives that no longer correspond to observable reality. he reuse of previously promoted propaganda slogans that have lost credibility may generate sustained cognitive dissonance both among segments of the Russian population and within the Russian media environment. In such cases, the resulting shift of public frustration may be directed toward those actors who repeatedly promoted slogans such as “the special military operation is proceeding according to plan,” “demilitarization,” and “denazification.” The present study does not analyze in detail the political responsibility of the Russian government for the conflict, but instead focuses on mechanisms capable of reducing the effectiveness of wartime propaganda and creating informational advantages for the state that has been subjected to military aggression. The paper also argues that the identified counter-propaganda mechanisms may have broader applicability beyond the Russian context. Similar approaches may potentially be applied against other authoritarian or totalitarian regimes whose propaganda systems rely heavily on rigid ideological slogans that can later be exposed as inconsistent with reality. Historical examples include slogans such as “a war with little bloodshed and on foreign territory,” widely circulated in Soviet military propaganda prior to the Second World War (People’s Commissariat of Defense of the USSR, 1939). Analogous strategies could theoretically involve the reuse of propaganda slogans from other regimes—for example, Iranian political slogans—within information campaigns during military confrontations involving Iran. At the same time, it is acknowledged that similar informational techniques might also be employed by the opposing side against Ukraine, although potentially with lower effectiveness given the differing structure of propaganda systems in democratic and authoritarian political environments. Finally, the paper notes that such slogans could also appear on drones assembled by anti-authoritarian activists or other opposition groups using civilian drone components. In such cases, drones could be adapted for kinetic actions against military targets considered lawful under the laws of armed conflict, including individuals accused of war crimes, using improvised kinetic mechanisms rather than explosive warheads (Velitsko, 2026c).
Vladislav Velitsko (Mon,) studied this question.