We discuss some of the relations between virtuality, digitality, and fictionality. We are interested in the questions of whether virtual worlds are real or fictional, and in what sense. Chalmers (Disputatio 9, 2017, Disputatio 11, 2019, Reality+: Virtual Worlds and the Problems of Philosophy, 2022) argues that virtual worlds are authentic realities on a par with ordinary reality because they are grounded in data structures. We analyze his argument and contend that virtual worlds are, in an important sense, fictional. In many cases, virtual Fs (e.g., apples, chairs) are not genuine Fs due to their digital nature. They are artificially designed to invite users to pretend that they are Fs, and this pretense is crucial for immersive and interactive VR experiences. In this sense, virtual objects are attributively fictional. It will thus be argued, pace Chalmers, that the digital nature of virtual reality implies its fictionality. Along the way, new light will be shed on the nature of virtual properties.
Park et al. (Fri,) studied this question.