ABSTRACT To receive justice in the legal system, one must be seen by the legal system; this is as true for nonhuman animal victims of crime as it is for human victims. Situating animal cruelty within the invisible crimes framework, this paper highlights the paucity of research on prosecutions and sentencing under animal welfare law. Due in part to a lack of transparency in the public and private institutions that regulate animal welfare, our understanding of how animals are recognized within legal systems has so far relied heavily on critiques of animal welfare legislation as written. Drawing on an original database of Australian prosecutions of cruelty cases ( n = 552) involving “pet” animals, this paper offers new, empirically centered perspectives on the legal treatment of animals. It calls for an expansion of the invisible crimes framework to include “invisible victims” and supports recent calls for animals to be recognized as crime victims.
Serrin Rutledge‐Prior (Mon,) studied this question.