Agent-Based Analysis of Electricity Contract Switching considering Multi-Dimensional Consumer Satisfaction and Social Influence

The widespread use of time-of-use (ToU) pricing tariffs in the liberalized retail electricity market has expanded households’ opportunities to choose and switch among retail electricity contracts. Understanding why consumers switch contracts is crucial for energy policy and market design, yet the psychological and social drivers of switching behavior remain poorly quantified. This study develops an agent-based modeling framework in which consumers make contract switching decisions considering both personal multi-dimensional satisfaction and peer effects from their social network, governed by a social influence factor β. Simulations reveal pronounced non-linear switching dynamics driven by heterogeneous consumer preferences. Economic rationality acts as a decision anchor that stabilizes market shares under moderate social influence, while strong peer effects give rise to distinct regime shifts in switching activity. Notably, a “social trap” emerges in which increased switching intensity coincides with declining average consumer satisfaction, despite individually rational decision-making. Under homogeneous preferences, switching exhibits a sharp phase transition around a tipping point separating stable and fluctuating market states. Under income-based heterogeneous preferences, switching thresholds become staggered across consumer groups: consumers with lower economic rationality transition at lower levels of social influence, whereas more economically rational consumers remain stable until substantially stronger peer effects prevail. These findings highlight how interaction-driven mechanisms shape consumer switching behavior and provide actionable insights for utilities and policymakers, including preference-specific contract design and interventions that strengthen the evaluability of contract attributes, to enhance consumer engagement in ToU pricing while maintaining market stability. • An agent-based framework integrates consumer satisfaction and social influence. • Socially weighted decisions generate a social trap reducing average satisfaction. • Identifies a phase transition from stable adoption to persistent market fluctuations. • Economic preference structures stabilize decisions under peer influence. • Preference heterogeneity shapes contract suitability and market outcomes.