This paper examines the structure, dynamics, and effects of hybrid threats, focusing on Montenegro's experience and positioning with respect to NATO and the European Union. Using a comparative and empirical framework, it analyses institutional vulnerabilities, the role of proxy actors, cyber-attacks, and regional resilience practices. The study draws on policy documents and reports from NATO, the EU, the UK FCDO, and local research centres, the Digital Forensic Centre (DFC) and the Centre for Democratic Transition (CDT), as well as comparative data from Serbia, Bosnia and Herzegovina, North Macedonia, and Albania. Through a case study of Montenegro, the paper maps key vectors of hybrid action: cyber-attacks targeting electoral processes and critical infrastructure, media-narrative campaigns aimed at delegitimising Euro-Atlantic integration, the operation of proxy actors linking domestic political and religious structures to external centres of influence, and economic and energy penetration that constrains institutional autonomy. A comparative regional analysis reveals shared patterns of sequential attack, whereby initial cyber incidents are amplified by subsequent disinformation campaigns, while highlighting differences in institutional resilience across the Western Balkans. The findings indicate that Montenegro's primary weaknesses lie in the fragmentation of its security sector, insufficient inter-institutional coordination, limited digital literacy, and a reactive rather than preventive approach to hybrid threats. The paper concludes with policy recommendations centred on the establishment of a national hybrid-threat monitoring centre, the introduction of digital and media literacy programmes, greater transparency in financing flows, and enhanced regional and international cooperation.
Nenad Koprivica (Thu,) studied this question.