Imagination constitutes one of the most contentious topics in Kant’s theoretical philosophy, with virtually no interpretative consensus among scholars. Central issues of dispute include the following questions: What is the relation between imagination, sensibility, and the understanding? Is imagination responsible for generating intuitions, and, if so, do concepts play a role in this process? What exactly does Kant mean when he writes that sensibility and understanding are connected through the imagination? In Seeing More Samantha Matherne answers these questions in a very interesting, precise, and novel way. Very roughly, she interprets Kant’s conception of the imagination as follows: With respect to the first question, she claims that sensibility consists of two parts—namely, sense and imagination. Thus, on her view, imagination is neither a part of the understanding nor an independent capacity distinct both from sensibility and understanding (50–71). In arguing that sensibility—the faculty responsible for generating intuitions—consists of two distinct parts, Matherne does not suggest that sense and imagination must cooperate to produce an intuition. Instead, she interprets Kant as distinguishing between two types of intuitions: intuitions of sense (intuitionss) and intuitions of imagination (intuitionsi) (71–77). Intuitionss are the direct result of objects affecting our senses. In order for an intuitioni to be generated, imagination has to synthesize the sensible manifold that intuitionss consist of. Both types of intuitions are conscious, intentional mental states. Yet, whereas intuitionss represent their objects as spatiotemporally undetermined, intuitionsi represent them as having a determinate spatiotemporal form (83–86). Furthermore, intuitionsi represent their objects as qualitatively determinate—that is, as “having properties shared by objects of a certain kind” (158). Intuitionss, by contrast, do not represent their objects as qualitatively determinate (157–61). Thus, according to Matherne, the second question cannot be answered with a simple yes or no. Imagination is not generally responsible for the generation of intuitions, but only for the generation of a specific kind—namely, intuitionsi. Since intuitionsi represent their objects as qualitatively determinate, and representing an object in this way requires possessing concepts, concepts play a role in the generation of intuitionsi but are not required for the generation of intuitionss (134). As for the third question, Matherne claims that imagination connects sensibility and understanding—in her terminology, mediates between the two capacities—by exhibiting concepts in intuition, or, put differently, by making concepts sensible (111–27). On her view, exhibiting concepts in intuition, or making them sensible, consists in generating an intuitioni—that is, an intuition that represents its object as falling under the concept being exhibited (124–27). For exhibiting the concept of a tree, say, it is not sufficient to generate an intuition that merely represents a tree. What matters, rather, is that the intuited object is represented as having the property of being a tree, a property that it shares with all other trees. Thus, according to Matherne, imagination, which is itself a part of sensibility, mediates not, strictly speaking, between sensibility and understanding but rather between sense and understanding.This is the conception of imagination that Matherne attributes to Kant in the first part of Seeing More. In the remaining three parts, she discusses the contribution of imagination in theoretical, aesthetic, and practical contexts, arguing that in all three contexts its contribution conforms to her general analysis. Even if one does not agree with this analysis, it is genuinely impressive how Matherne succeeds in developing a unified account of the imagination’s role across such diverse domains.Matherne begins the second part, in which she examines the exercise of imagination in the theoretical domain, by discussing a specific kind of intuitioni—namely, perceptual images or perceptions. She argues that, in order to generate such perceptions, schemata must guide the act of synthesis by which perceptions are formed. Furthermore, she examines the a priori exercise of the imagination and the way in which it is involved in perception and experience. In line with the book’s general interpretive framework, she distinguishes between two different kinds of pure intuitions of space and time. On her view, sense on its own generates intuitionss of space and time. By synthesizing the manifold of these intuitionss under the guidance of the categories, the imagination generates intuitionsi of space and time that exhibit the categories. In this way imagination mediates between the intuitions of space and time provided by sense and the categories. One difference between the a priori and the empirical exercise of the imagination is that the formation of intuitionsi of space and time does not require guidance by schemata. Instead, Matherne equates intuitionsi of time with the schemata of the categories, which serve as rules guiding the synthesis that underlies perception and experience.In the third part of her book, Matherne explains how imagination is used in aesthetic contexts—more specifically, in our appreciation of beauty, in artistic production, and in our engagement with the sublime. With regard to the appreciation of beautiful objects, she argues against a precognitive interpretation of the free play of imagination and understanding. By contrast, she maintains that the free play involves an open-ended conceptualization that makes concepts sensible in a “particularly dynamic, lively, and expansive way” (265). Furthermore, she argues that, in our aesthetic engagement with the sublime, imagination indirectly exhibits the idea of the sublimity of our rational capacities. An indirect exhibition of a concept, in her view, differs from a direct exhibition in that the sensible representations contained in the intuitioni through which the relevant concept is exhibited do not correspond to the marks that are contained in the concept. Instead, a concept is indirectly exhibited through an intuitioni if reflection on that intuitioni is conducive to reflection on the concept (312).The final part of Seeing More, which is more reconstructive than the preceding ones, addresses the practical use of imagination. According to Matherne, in the practical domain imagination performs two different functions. First, as a capacity for seeing more, it helps the faculty of desire to specify practical principles, to determine on which of them one should act in a given situation, and to decide which course of action to pursue. Secondly, as a capacity of exhibition, imagination makes moral concepts sensible. It indirectly exhibits the idea of the moral law, of freedom, and of practical reason through intuitionsi of the mathematical and the dynamical sublime, and the idea of the morally good through intuitionsi of beautiful objects. Furthermore, it directly exhibits moral ideas like friendship through moral ideals and through empirical intuitionsi of actual human beings whose actions are examples of these ideas.The richness of Seeing More made it genuinely difficult for me to decide which aspects of the book to engage with in greater depth. Since its central claim is that the cognitive function of imagination is to exhibit concepts and thereby to mediate between sensibility and understanding, I will focus on how Matherne characterizes the imagination’s mediating function—more specifically, on her account of how it fulfills this function in theoretical contexts. My first remark is that, when it comes to empirical representations, Matherne—without explicitly acknowledging it—presents two different accounts of how imagination mediates between sense, on the one hand, and understanding, on the other hand. As I have already noted, according to her, imagination fulfills its mediating function by generating intuitionsi, and thus by making concepts sensible. At the beginning of the second part of Seeing More, Matherne points out that intuitionsi which make empirical concepts sensible are perceptual images or perceptions. Yet, later in the second part, she addresses a different kind of mediating representation: schemata. In her view, schemata, just like perceptual images, are products of the imagination—that is, intuitionsi (148). Thus, there are two kinds of representations—perceptual images and empirical schemata—that mediate between empirical intuitions and empirical concepts. Since Matherne does not make it explicit that she distinguishes between these two types of mediating representations, it remains unclear how exactly she understands Kant’s conception of mediation. Does she interpret him as using “mediation” in a single sense, assuming that both perceptual images and empirical schemata are required for that one kind of mediation? Or does she attribute to Kant two distinct concepts of mediation, believing that perceptual images are needed for one kind of mediation, while empirical schemata are needed for the other?Furthermore—this is the second point I wish to raise—her account of empirical schemata as mediating representations raises some questions that are not fully answered in the book. First, it is unclear to me between which representations empirical schemata are intended to mediate. What I am not sure about is whether empirical schemata are supposed to mediate between empirical concepts and empirical intuitionss or between empirical concepts and empirical intuitionsi. As far as I can see, it would be most plausible to assume that Matherne holds the first view. This is because she assumes that schemata mediate between intuitions and concepts by bridging the gap between singular and general representations (148). Thus, she might claim that empirical schemata bridge this gap insofar as they guide synthesis and thereby give rise to perceptual images (intuitionsi)— that is, representations that, in her view, make concepts sensible and therefore can be conceived of as not purely singular. However, she cannot attribute this position to Kant, since—as she points out herself—in the Schematism chapter he characterizes perceptual images as singular representations that themselves require mediation (148). Therefore, she seems forced to claim that empirical schemata mediate between perceptual images—that is, intuitionsi—and empirical concepts. Yet she cannot adopt this position either. As I have already pointed out, according to Matherne, empirical schemata, by guiding acts of the imagination, generate perceptual images—representations that, as we have just seen, are singular representations. But if the use of empirical schemata results in the generation of singular representations, it cannot also consist in mediating between singular and general representations. Thus, it seems that Matherne can claim neither that empirical schemata mediate between intuitionss and concepts, nor that they mediate between intuitionsi and concepts. Second, there is a further reason to doubt that schemata—as Matherne conceives them—can mediate between singular and general representations. On her view, when sense generates an intuitions, imagination synthesizes the manifold it contains under the guidance of an empirical schema. Yet, in order for a specific empirical schema to guide synthesis, the intuitions must be recognized or classified as one that calls for a synthesis under the guidance of this, and not some other, schema. Put differently, for a schema to guide synthesis, the intuition must already be classified as an instance of some general kind. Accordingly, by serving as a rule for synthesis, the schema does not bridge the gap between a singular and a general representation. On the contrary, it can only serve as such a rule, if this gap has already been bridged.Seeing More is highly valuable for anyone seeking an overview of Kant’s conception of imagination. It is admirable how Matherne manages to construct a coherent theory out of Kant’s numerous scattered remarks on the imagination. Regardless of whether one agrees with her interpretation in every detail, it is immensely valuable to have a work that systematically addresses all aspects of the imagination—especially one written in such a remarkably clear and accessible style.
Stefanie Grüne (Mon,) studied this question.
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