This article argues that certain irredeemable evildoers qualify—at least in some cases—as post-persons under certain normative accounts of personhood. Post-persons are conventionally understood as individuals who, due to injury, sickness, or cognitive decline, no longer meet the criteria for personhood where personhood is understood in terms of certain cognitive capacities. However, this article extends the concept to cases of moral failure in a way that has hitherto been neglected in the debate. Drawing on a Kantian-Arendtian conception of personhood, it argues that personhood includes not just rational or cognitive capacities, but moral reasoning and the capacity for remorse. Irredeemable evildoers—those whose actions are profoundly cruel and who persistently reject accountability—may forfeit their moral standing as persons. This shift from biological to moral criteria has serious implications for how we understand and treat such individuals.
Thomas J. Spiegel (Mon,) studied this question.