Australia’s Obligations for the Acquisition and Operation of Nuclear Submarines under AUKUS: What Can Article 14 of its Comprehensive Safeguards Agreement with the IAEA Tell us?

Abstract Australia is pursuing the acquisition and operation of nuclear-powered submarines in collaboration with the United States and the United Kingdom under the AUKUS initiative. In accordance with Article 14 of its Comprehensive Safeguards Agreement (CSA) with the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA), Australia has invoked the non-application of safeguards to nuclear material used in non-proscribed military activities. This paper argues that Article 14 is applicable in this context, and emphasizes that the non-application of safeguards resulting from the application of this Article is not automatic and entails two sets of obligations for Australia: the obligation of notification and the obligation of making an arrangement. First, Australia is obliged to inform the IAEA of the non-proscribed military activity in question, to ensure that the use of the nuclear material in nuclear-powered submarines does not conflict with its undertaking under the CSA that the nuclear material will be used only in a peaceful nuclear activity. Furthermore, Australia must guarantee that the nuclear material will not be used for the production of nuclear weapons or other nuclear explosive devices. Second, Australia is obliged to enter into a separate arrangement with the Agency. The arrangement must identify, to the extent possible, the period or circumstances during which the safeguards will not apply. Additionally, the arrangement must stipulate that Australia is obliged to keep the IAEA informed of the quantity and composition of the unsafeguarded nuclear material and any exports of such material. From a procedural perspective, it is now up to the IAEA and the Member States to decide how the arrangement required by Article 14 should be adopted, in particular whether it should be approved by the Board of Governors. In any case, any arrangement that fails to achieve the fundamental objective of non-proliferation would set a detrimental precedent for the international non-proliferation regime.