Purpose This study aims to investigate the phenomenon of self-blocking in defense procurement budget coordination through a case study of Indonesia’s 2016 satellite acquisition project. Self-blocking refers to the unilateral freezing of budget allocations by a single organizational unit without notifying stakeholders, creating information asymmetry and coordination failure. Design/methodology/approach This research uses qualitative document analysis of procurement chronologies, investigative examination records (BAP), budget revisions (DIPA), audit reports (BPKP) and court decisions. Agency theory and coordination theory are used to examine institutional incentives and communication breakdowns. Triangulation across multiple sources enhances reliability. Findings Three mechanisms explain the project failure: internal sabotage, administrative entrapment and coordination incompetence. Uncoordinated budget self-blocking created severe information asymmetry, resulting in project collapse, recorded financial losses of IDR 759.9bn and the unjust prosecution of the Project Commitment Officer (PPK), despite evidence of good-faith action. Government audits confirmed both the self-blocking practice and procedural violations. A jurisdictional paradox emerged when civil courts refused review while military courts lack praperadilan mechanisms, denying the PPK access to justice. Research limitations/implications This study relies solely on documentary evidence, as interviews were not possible due to ongoing legal proceedings, limiting insight into actors’ motivations and informal dynamics. Retrospective bias may also affect the objectivity of testimonies, though multiple independent documents allow cross-validation. The unavailability of the original self-blocking letter constrains direct analysis and restricts access to classified communications, limiting understanding of internal decision-making within the Ministry of Defence. Finally, as a single-case study, statistical generalization is limited, though the case enables analytic generalization to theories of defense procurement governance and bureaucratic information asymmetries. Practical implications This case offers practical implications for improving defense procurement governance in Indonesia. Strengthening mandatory cross-agency notification and integrating real-time budget systems can prevent information asymmetry that exposes frontline officers to wrongful liability. Good-faith protections and clearer accountability pathways are essential to prevent lower-level officials from being punished for decisions shaped by undisclosed internal actions. Independent oversight units and risk-based procurement controls can reduce financial losses and detect potential sabotage or administrative entrapment. Finally, legal reforms – particularly establishing pretrial review mechanisms in military justice − are needed to close remedy gaps and ensure procedural fairness in complex interagency budget processes. Social implications This case has significant social implications. Coordination failures and horizontal information asymmetry in public procurement erode trust in government institutions, particularly when good-faith officials are punished for decisions shaped by undisclosed internal actions. Such injustices signal to society that accountability is unevenly applied, undermining perceptions of fairness in the justice system. The findings also highlight how opaque bureaucratic practices can generate large public financial losses, reducing resources available for social services. Addressing these issues is essential to strengthening institutional integrity, ensuring equitable treatment of public officials and maintaining citizens’ confidence in state decision-making processes. Originality/value This study conceptualizes self-blocking as a novel administrative pathology and identifies horizontal information asymmetry as a distinct source of organizational failure. It highlights procedural, substantive and jurisdictional injustices and recommends mandatory notification protocols, integrated budget systems and legal safeguards for project implementers.
Suwanda et al. (Thu,) studied this question.