We are spatially embedded beings; we live on the land and we share the land; and yet how we ought to relate to land is a deeply disputed question. In Contested Territory, Anna Jurkevics interrogates our relationship to land. She offers a sharp and compelling analysis of the pitfalls that the territorial imaginary – if intertwined with sovereignty claims – can lead to. She then proposes a revised conception of territory, one in which our relationship to land and its governance are stripped of their most damaging components and have an emancipatory potential instead. Jurkevics starts from the intuition that the right to place should be foundational in an international system of overlapping territories (p. 28). Throughout her analysis, she explores what this would entail and offers the reader a theory ‘that is both cosmopolitan and democratic, that is universalist in its principled pursuit of freedom, and yet grounded in concrete communities seeking to govern the land they share with others’ (p. 9). In what follows, I will discuss and assess her proposal. I will argue that her critical analysis of the problems inherent in the system of territorial sovereign states is especially compelling, but that her positive view leaves several questions unanswered and calls for further development. I am aware, though, that the task of a theory is not to give us all the answers, but to help raise the right questions; and Jurkevics has fully achieved that. In Part I of the book, Jurkevics attacks what she calls the ‘sovereign territorial imaginary’ (p. 14). The sovereign territorial state is built on three elements, that is, exclusivity, exclusion, and mastery (p. 30), that contribute to the contradictions and crises of our current territorial system. Exclusivity tries to protect self-determination, but promotes invasion and conquest instead. Exclusion produces walls and injustices. Mastery undermines environmental sustainability and encourages resource depletion. The picture drawn by Jurkevics is rather bleak, but it is unfortunately the situation we are grappling with today. If territory is governed by sovereign units, as it is, many political issues that we currently face risk remaining unsolved, Jurkevics argues, as these very problems are endemic to the sovereign territorial framework (p. 31). Crises of statelessness, land theft and loss, conquest and colonisation, and environmental issues are all challenges that the current system of sovereign territorial states has contributed to creating and is ill equipped to solve. Jurkevics counts among the growing number of scholars who have examined the issues inherent in our current territorial system built on sovereign states and sought to address them. According to Jurkevics, the solutions given by most are unsatisfactory. Many contemporary theories of territorial rights have attempted to overcome the problems of the sovereign territorial imaginary without completely replacing it. As a result, they cannot fully address the crises they set out to solve. Scholars such as Anna Stilz in Territorial Sovereignty: A Philosophical Exploration (2019) and Margaret Moore in A Political Theory of Territory (2015) have proposed different revisions to the current territorial system of states. Yet, as Jurkevics argues, ‘Why not simply dispense with it?’ (p. 16). If the sovereign state is built on invasion and conquest, and perpetuates a system of environmental depredation, resource depletion, land dispossession, and exclusion of migrants, as we increasingly witness today, why should we try to save it? Are there other, better alternatives available? I think Jurkevics is correct in asking these questions: by trying to maintain a system that continues to reveal its endemic flaws, we might overlook better alternatives. Jurkevics' alternative, on which I will expand below, is a cosmopolitan theory of territory based on an idea of participatory democracy that emerges from below, from our situatedness in the land. Thus Jurkevics, although firmly a cosmopolitan, rejects another line of response invoked by many cosmopolitans to deal with the current flaws of the territorial system of states. Cosmopolitans reject sovereignty and territory altogether, since they see them as inevitably linked. In so doing, they miss something that is normatively significant to maintain: our relationship to land. Here, again, I think Jurkevics' assessment is convincing: ‘We are creatures of the land, and we will always be territorial in some sense. Therefore, even cosmopolitans need a theory of territory’ (p. 19). A system of deterritorialised units is simply untenable since we have no other option but to live on the land. As she writes, ‘freedom does not require emancipation from land, but rather an emancipated relationship with land’ (p. 176). Her proposed theory seeks to show us how we can achieve that. Part I is the most provocative part of the book. Jurkevics draws out the contradictions in the mainstream territorial imaginary and attacks those who aim at revising the current territorial system rather than dispensing with it. It is difficult to disagree with Jurkevics' analysis of the ‘perplexities of territorial sovereignty’ (p. 31), that is, the issues that the current territorial framework keeps perpetuating, such as crises of statelessness, invasion, conquest, and land grabs. However, while Jurkevics presents her approach as distinct from scholarly proposals that revise the current system of territorial states, the divergence between them appears more limited than her framing implies. As Jurkevics herself recognises (pp. 75–76), both Moore and Stilz defend self-determination rights for non-statist groups, such as indigenous peoples or minority groups, which entail some rights over land and resources. In practice, this would introduce overlapping units of territorial jurisdiction holding rights over shared land that are more limited than exclusive sovereignty (which neither Moore nor Stilz advocates for). Hence, while Jurkevics is undoubtedly more explicit in her commitment to dispensing with sovereignty claims than, for example, Stilz, whose theory is described as a theory of ‘territorial sovereignty’, some of the argument's key implications are not that distinct. Problematising the current territorial rights of states, unbundling their different incidents (e.g. right to jurisdictional authority, to resource appropriation, to border control, etc.), subjecting them to more stringent limitations, and protecting the territorial rights of different individuals and groups, including non-statist minorities, has been done by contemporary accounts of territorial rights. Jurkevics' theory is then still solidly placed in this tradition, with the added merit that she is grasping more fully the revolutionary implications of this approach, and she is bringing them to light. To expand on this further, Jurkevics sides with scholars, such as Cara Nine in Sharing Territories: Overlapping Self-determination and Resource Rights (2022) and Paulina Ochoa Espejo in On Borders: Territories, Legitimacy, and the Rights of Place (2020), who have set their theories against a ‘desert island model’ of territory (i.e. the model defended by Moore and Stilz) with discrete and self-contained units with territorial jurisdiction and no overlap, and have argued instead for a place-based conception of territory or a ‘river model’ where jurisdictions overlap. However, as mentioned, it is not so clear that scholars such as Moore and Stilz could not endorse a system of overlapping territorial units, where rights over land are built from the ground up via looking at the actual relationships between individuals and land. Despite these considerations, let me reiterate that Jurkevics is right in arguing that the practice of ‘fracturing sovereignty’ (p. 17) needs to be embraced. There is a lot of value in pointing out the flaws nested in territorial sovereignty, as Jurkevics very lucidly does, and Part I of the book achieves what it was meant to achieve: questioning the ‘sovereign territorial imaginary’ and asking us to imagine something different. Before turning to her positive proposal, Jurkevics devotes Part II of the book to discussing some forgotten traditions that depict a different territorial imaginary than the sovereign one. She aims to ‘dig up some of what has gone missing and bring to light a hidden tradition of theorizing contested territory’ (p. 82; emphasis in original). Her historical approach in this part of the book is a helpful reminder that what today is ‘the norm’ (i.e. a system of sovereign territorial states) was not always so, and that it has become the norm only through contingent events. Her analysis sheds light on some overlooked aspects of the Western tradition that can teach us something different about our relationship to land. Notably, Jurkevics shows the reader that the Westphalian tradition, which became wrongly associated with exclusive sovereignty, supported a model of non-sovereign territorial autonomy and overlapping rule. Additionally, by putting Hannah Arendt in conversation with Carl Schmitt, Jurkevics argues that (territorial) sovereignty is inextricably linked to conquest in a ‘blood and soil’ equation, and points out that more horizontal alternatives are available. In this part of the book, Jurkevics draws together the threads that form the foundation of her theory, and she reveals that alternative non-sovereign territorial systems are compatible with democracy and freedom. In Part III of the book, Jurkevics argues for a different conception of territory, one based on overlapping non-sovereign territorial jurisdictions, and outlines an emancipatory democratic theory based on participation in land governance. Jurkevics correctly states that ‘we cannot really be free unless we have a say in the shape of the place where we live’ (p. 149). As mentioned earlier, freedom does not require detachment from the land, but an emancipated relationship with it. What is needed is ‘participation in rule’, rather than a ‘rule by the people’ (p. 145). Popular sovereignty or majoritarian rule often makes democratic rule over land impossible. Think about the Sámi in Norway, whose land-based practices are violated in one of the strongest democracies in the world (pp. 204–5). Here, Jurkevics reminds democratic theorists that participation in land governance is fundamental for democracy, something that has been largely overlooked. Participatory democracy, as she argues, ‘ought to include the practices of world-building’, where world-building ‘encompasses the infrastructural and geographical practices through which collectivities build, rebuild, negotiate, and govern their shared physical world’ (p. 142). These practices include several things, such as ‘zoning, the regulation of infrastructure and public space, land use and food production, housing and tenancy rights, negotiation of the property regime, and the regulation of resources and ecosystems’ (p. 142). Through democratic world-building, individuals residing in a place can shape and transform it through a participatory and respectful approach. Practices that are invasive or based on mastery are excluded. Democratic world-building also entails that all inhabitants of a place, including non-humans, must participate in its practices (p. 143). This inclusion is one of the most innovative parts of her book. Jurkevics is perhaps the first contemporary territorial rights theorist, at least within the dominant tradition to which Jurkevics mainly speaks, who is explicit in her commitment to extending recognition to non-humans. While her definition of ‘non-humans’ is vague (is she talking about individual non-human animals, species, other living entities beyond animals, or all the above?), including them as participants in land governance and world-building practices is a welcome proposal. However, I find Jurkevics' discussion of this inclusion underdeveloped in her book. Overall, I think that more engagement with the arguments defended by animal rights theorists could have helped her develop this discussion further. For instance, it would have been interesting to explore what happens when indigenous practices that harm individual non-human animals clash with the rights of non-human animals (starting from the right to life), as advocated by many animal rights scholars. Can killing ever be respectful, some could ask? And is that compatible with practices of democratic world-building in which all inhabitants (humans and non-humans) of a place should take part? Additionally, consider that Jurkevics argues for the usefulness of treaties in regulating the relationship between humans and non-humans. She draws on the Anishinaabe conception of treaty as a living relationship guided by principles of respect, responsibility, and renewal (pp. 211–16). Treaties can bridge the discursive divide between different species, Jurkevics notes. Here again, I wonder whether she should have considered other contemporary scholarly defences of multispecies justice and pioneer accounts advocating dialogue among humans and non-humans. While there is much to learn from other traditions, as Jurkevics shows us, there is a growing non-anthropocentric debate from within the Western tradition that would be worth exploring if the aim is to include non-human animals in democratic politics. Going back to her argument in Part III, Jurkevics outlines a cosmopolitan and democratic theory of territory, where territorial constituency is the basis of legitimate rule, and democracy emerges at all levels (i.e. local, subnational, national, transnational, and supranational) in a horizontal system where no sovereignty is assigned. Territorial residence is, in a sense, the ‘anchor’ of the entire system. It is exactly through residence and participation in world-building that one becomes a citizen of a territory (p. 239). Similarly to others before her, such as Ochoa Espejo, Jurkevics sees ‘territorial residence’ as the fundamental basis of political constituency, as opposed to conceptions of peoplehood based on some ascribed identity, cultural or religious traits, or shared institutions. Because of this recognition, her theory ‘embraces open border policies, accepts the realities of human mobility, and assigns territorial rights by inhabitation rather than national belonging’ (p. 246). I think Jurkevics is right in highlighting the necessity of a place to live for everyone and in arguing that the current system of territorial states creates gaps in which many individuals have lost their rights, for instance via exclusionary migration policies. Recognising territorial residence and the right to place as foundational in the international system, as she does, would address some of these issues, because everyone would have the right to reside and participate in world-building somewhere. What I find less clear is how to implement this, especially in situations of power asymmetries. Although mentioned as key challenges that her theory can address, mobility issues and crises of statelessness are underexplored topics throughout the book. Take, for instance, the threat that climate change and sea-level rise pose to entire island states in the Pacific Ocean and their populations, such as in Tuvalu or Kiribati. In these contexts, the relationship between specific individuals (and groups) and their land is disrupted and, possibly, permanently severed. Although we can see this extreme case as one in which the relationship to land ‘has become supremely disoriented’ (p. 253), Jurkevics' theory of contested territory is silent on it. Will the population of Tuvalu be scattered around the world with new citizenship rights based on a new territorial residence? What if Tuvaluans move to Australia? How would they be able to maintain their world-building practices as a minority in what is a clearly asymmetrical relationship of power? In Jurkevics' model, people should integrate themselves where they move to, with the specification that practices of world-building are never permanent and always open to contestation (p. 194). To be fair, Jurkevics also concedes that sometimes ‘identity-based group rights may be necessary in certain situations’ (p. 209), especially in the case of oppressed minority groups. Still, according to Jurkevics, identity models are subsumed under territorial residence. As she argues, identity is based on shared inhabitation of land (p. 241). But what happens when the land that constitutes one's identity is lost? For instance, note that the term ‘te aba’ means both land and people in the language of the people of Kiribati, underlying a clear link between land and identity. What should be done when that specific land is lost? Would an ‘open border’ policy be an adequate solution? Most importantly, would Tuvaluans and I-Kiribati (i.e. the members of the Kiribati population) cease to be Tuvaluans and I-Kiribati because their land is submerged, given that ‘territorial residence is the most fundamental basis of democratic constituency’ (p. 27)? Consider that Tuvalu is currently implementing a project to become ‘the first digital nation’ to keep existing as a nation even if its current territory is lost. Would Jurkevics' territorial principle be too restrictive in this case? If territorial residence is the basis for democratic constituencies, her model might disregard attempts to reconceptualise territory in a non-physical sense when land is lost, and imply that these individuals would simply become part of different constituencies. Yet, as the people of these island states claim, something would be lost. I do not exclude that Jurkevics' theory could accommodate this issue, as well as successfully address many other situations of mobility and instances of changing land. As mentioned at the beginning of this review, the fact that many questions remain unanswered does not take any validity away from her account and her vision of a better territorial system. Let me conclude by stressing again that Jurkevics' book is an important contribution to current debates on territorial rights, land governance, and democratic theory, and it pushes the debate on territorial rights towards a still under-explored path. Although not a blueprint for a new territorial system, as she herself recognises (p. 28), her book paves the way for a reconceptualisation of territory and shows us that we ought to share land in a respectful manner with one another and with other non-human entities. Her book recognises that territory is indeed contested, and that we should embrace the chaos, conflicts, and acts of resistance that inevitably arise as we live together in a shared space. There are no easy solutions, but to accept the messiness of the different democratic world-building practices through which we live and transform the land. This is an important lesson that Jurkevics' book teaches us. In a time when land will increasingly change, once-habitable places will become uninhabitable, mobility will be on the rise, and new conflicts over land will arise, we will need a novel approach to territorial governance that treats the right to place as foundational and embraces overlapping and often conflicting land practices and claims over territory. Jurkevics' book represents a meaningful move in the right direction, one that I hope many more scholars after her will follow.
Virginia De Biasio (Thu,) studied this question.