Formal necessity

In this paper, a hylomorphic reading of Kant’s account of laws of nature is discussed. It is argued that existing interpretations cannot make sense of Kant’s commitment to empirical laws of nature, because they construe matters in such a way that there is an opposition between the necessity that comes with lawhood and the empiricality—and hence contingency—of empirical laws of nature. It is laid out how a hylomorphic reading does not come with said opposition and is thus a promising candidate for making sense of Kant’s commitment to empirical laws of nature. Furthermore, the distinction between two senses of necessity that are in play regarding empirical laws of nature is proposed: for one, the necessity of the causal connection and, then, the necessity of a specific law’s being a law. Clearly distinguishing these two senses of necessity removes interpretative pressure towards the existing interpretations and thus opens up the possibility of a hylomorphic reading. It is further shown how such a reading, including its connection to Kant’s account of cognitive capacities, allows one to comprehend many passages in which Kant employs hylomorphic vocabulary. Indeed, Kant is arguing in these passages for a hylomorphic account.