Contemporary ontologies often assign states-of-affairs a central role in explaining semantic content, causation, and truth. This paper examines how Bernard Bolzano’s ontology—built around substances, adherences, and propositions in themselves—successfully fulfils these explanatory roles without invoking states-of-affairs, conceived as concrete complexes of objects and universals. By closely analyzing Bolzano’s original texts, including key aspects previously overlooked, the paper reconstructs his alternative machinery and highlights its ongoing systematic relevance. It also revisits the wrong historical narrative that credits Bolzano with pioneering the notion of states-of-affairs, arguing that such attributions rest on a misreading of his ontology. Reappraising Bolzano’s rigorous approach not only corrects the historical record but also offers fresh insight into contemporary debates on ontology, grounding, and truth.
Schnieder et al. (Fri,) studied this question.