This paper undertakes a comparative analysis of the constitution alteration procedures in Nigeria and Ghana, with a view to examining how each system balances the competing demands of constitutional rigidity and adaptability. It interrogates the legal frameworks governing constitution alteration in both jurisdictions, focusing on section 9 of the Constitution of the Federal Republic of Nigeria 1999 and articles 289-290 of the 1992 Constitution of Ghana. The paper reveals that while both countries adopt rigid constitutional models, Nigeria relies on a federal, legislature-driven process requiring multi-level approval, whereas Ghana incorporates direct popular participation through referendums, particularly for entrenched provisions. The paper argues that these differing approaches have produced distinct practical outcomes. Nigeria’s model, though complex and elite-driven, has facilitated incremental constitutional reform, while Ghana’s stringent referendum thresholds, requiring both high voter turnout and supermajority approval, have often impeded successful amendments. The analysis further highlights key challenges, including limited public participation in Nigeria, excessive rigidity in Ghana, and concerns regarding institutional roles such as the involvement of the Council of State. The paper concludes by proposing reforms aimed at enhancing both efficiency and legitimacy, including clarifying procedural ambiguities, strengthening civic engagement, and recalibrating amendment thresholds. It contends that a balanced approach is essential to ensuring that constitutions remain both stable and responsive to changing governance needs.
Oguche et al. (Mon,) studied this question.