As Global Navigation Satellite Systems (GNSSs) underpin safety-critical infrastructure, their vulnerability to sophisticated spoofing attacks poses severe physical layer security risks. To address the limitations of existing single-antenna defense mechanisms, this paper proposes a rigorous instantaneous spoofing detection framework utilizing a novel “one-primary-two-auxiliary” three-antenna configuration. By embedding the rigid baseline length as a hard geometric constraint into the Integer Least Squares (ILS) model, we derive a specialized constrained LAMBDA algorithm that significantly shrinks the ambiguity search space. A rigorous hypothesis testing mechanism is established based on the Sum of Squared Residuals (SSR), analytically deriving the detection threshold from the central Chi-square distribution and analyzing the sensitivity via the non-central parameter. Through conducting field experiments using commercial receivers and professional GNSS signal simulators, the proposed method was validated using both single-satellite spoofing and full-constellation spoofing scenarios. Results demonstrate that the system achieves a Minimum Detectable Deviation (MDD) of spatial direction as low as 0.33∘ and maintains an empirical detection rate of >99% with a negligible false alarm rate. Notably, the method exhibits instantaneous response capabilities, effectively identifying both single-satellite and full-constellation spoofing attacks within a single epoch without requiring prior attitude information or external aiding.
Chen et al. (Fri,) studied this question.