Purpose This study aims to examine the interplay between infrastructure development and environmental protection, focusing on how governmental regulations shape contractor behavior and exploring policy mechanisms that reconcile economic and ecological objectives. Design/methodology/approach An integrated framework combining evolutionary game theory and system dynamics simulation models the interactions between contractors and regulatory agencies. Computational experiments assess the effects of penalties and public reporting systems on behavioral stability. Findings Analysis reveals three significant outcomes: (1) Pure strategy solutions fail to achieve evolutionary stability regardless of parameter configurations; (2) Mixed strategy equilibria demonstrate conditional stability, particularly when public reporting systems are operational; (3) While both financial penalties and public disclosure influence short-term behavior modification, only robust public monitoring systems generate sustainable compliance patterns over extended periods. Research limitations/implications The findings deepen understanding of how government–contractor interactions shape sustainable infrastructure development, emphasizing the pivotal role of regulatory design and behavioral adaptation in achieving enduring environmental and economic balance. Practical implications Policymakers should prioritize public reporting and strengthen monitoring systems to align contractor incentives with ecological goals. Combining penalty mechanisms with transparent oversight offers a coherent and lasting approach to advancing green construction and maintaining regulatory compliance. Originality/value This study proposes a novel framework integrating evolutionary game theory with system dynamics, rarely applied in infrastructure governance. It captures dynamic feedback between contractors and regulators and shows that transparency mechanisms outperform punitive measures in sustaining compliance, offering clear guidance for policy optimization.
Zhang et al. (Mon,) studied this question.