Abstract In his article “Ethics of Autonomy,” Dieter Henrich investigates the development of the concept of (moral) autonomy from Kant to later German idealism. He finds that Kant’s ethics was based on a dualism of the rational and the emotional, which was reflected in Kant’s concept of respect for the moral law as moral feeling and led to theoretical difficulties. Henrich sees this as the problem that gave impetus to the further development of Kant’s theory of autonomy in post-Kantian idealism. Like Henrich, Mou Zongsan recognizes this problem in Kant’s ethics. Mou invokes Mencius’ theory of “ liangzhi ” (original knowing) in order to solve the theoretical difficulties into which Kant’s ethics falls. Following Mencius, Mou proposes to reconstruct Kant’s theory of autonomy by elevating moral feeling to the level of the moral subject and combining it with practical reason. Through this, Mou transforms Kant’s “autonomy of reason” into the “autonomy of heart.”
Ming-huei Lee (Thu,) studied this question.