Abstract In this paper, I want to challenge the rationalist-compatibilist intuition that for freedom to be a rational two-way power, the relation to reasons cannot be a mere necessary condition for the actualization of the power. To this end, I discuss Crusius’s voluntarist conception as a historical case study. According to Crusius, any choice of an action, as the activity of freedom, requires not only the evaluation of the available options but also something like the ‘active embrace’ of an option as a necessary condition. It will become clear that this ‘active embrace’ is Crusius’ way of expressing the incompatibilist idea that there is no necessary, determining connection between judgement and choice. This conception of freedom has the advantage over rationalist-compatibilist approaches that it is much better suited to account for the case of choosing between equally good options. This case is crucial to us as rational agents when it comes to the question of what to make of one’s life, what career to choose. In my view then, that Crusius’s approach can account for this case is a reason that strongly speaks in favor of his conception of freedom.
Sonja Schierbaum (Tue,) studied this question.