The phase-out of purchase subsidies for new energy vehicles (NEVs) marks a pivotal shift in China’s industrial policy towards market-driven development. This study investigates the impact of China’s phase-out of the NEV purchase subsidy policy on enterprise research and development (R&D) investment. A government-enterprise sequential game model was constructed, and equilibrium solutions under continuous subsidy and phase-out scenarios were compared. The theoretical analysis indicates that the phase-out policy reduces enterprise R&D investment. Furthermore, panel data from Chinese listed new energy vehicle enterprises between 2009 and 2021 were employed, with the propensity score matching-difference-in-differences (PSM-DID) method applied for empirical analysis. The estimates reveal that the policy significantly reduces R&D investment by an average of 28.14%, corresponding to approximately CNY 112.56 million, among affected enterprises. This negative effect persists through multiple robustness checks and demonstrates an increasing magnitude over time. This paper offers a theoretical foundation for the dynamic optimization of industrial purchase subsidy phase-out policies.
Fan et al. (Tue,) studied this question.