Abstract Research in experimental philosophy of language has been taken to show that non-philosophers do not uniformly assign reference in accordance with the causal-historical account of reference determination. The setup most frequently used in this research is one that is modelled on Kripke’s Gödel case. This paper will distinguish three cognitive mechanisms behind participants’ responses that might potentially result in responses of relevance to theories of reference. If participants utilize the first cognitive mechanism, their response is based on what I call their “acquired use”, that is, on how they understand the reference of the target term in their own idiolect. If participants utilize the second or third cognitive mechanism, their response is based on their explicit or implicit theories of reference, respectively. I will argue that the first and second way of answering the probe question cannot deliver responses that tell us anything about which theory of reference is true. Additionally, I will argue that if the third way of answering the probe question can result in responses that tell us something about which theory of reference is true, such responses cannot be distinguished from those that don’t. If correct, Gödel-style setups cannot properly support a theory of reference.
Jeske Toorman (Fri,) studied this question.