Abstract Asset managers, private equity firms and other institutional investors have assumed an increasingly important role in the ownership and management of housing and infrastructure since the Global Financial Crisis. This article analyses how social housing in London is being transformed into a financial asset through an analysis of ‘income strip’ leases, long‐term contractual arrangements between institutional investors and local authorities. Building on insights from urban political economy and the social studies of finance, we explore the moral politics, temporal logics and forms of obligation and risk embedded in these financial arrangements. We situate the rise of income strips within a longer arc of state–market entanglements and argue that they exemplify a recursive and cyclical tendency in the local state's experimentation with private finance. At the level of the contract and the asset, we show how value and risk are distributed and negotiated, and how income strips produce hierarchies of obligation and indebtedness. While institutional investment into social housing is narrated as a ‘common sense’ policy solution that promises to fill the ‘housing gap’ and secure returns for workers’ retirement savings, we show how income strips erode security of tenure, increase rents and entangle states and tenants in new forms of financial obligation, foreclosing alternative political imaginaries.
Bloom et al. (Sun,) studied this question.