This paper examines how malicious domain registrations can be identified at an early stage to support a more proactive approach to DNS abuse mitigation. Rather than relying only on reactive indicators such as blocklists, phishing reports, or post-attack detection, the study focuses on registration-time and early infrastructure signals that may reveal malicious intent before a domain is actively used in abuse. It reviews key patterns including burst registrations, naming similarities, registrar and nameserver concentration, low-reputation infrastructure, and domain lifecycle behaviors such as early deletions and re-registrations. Drawing on recent research and policy developments, the paper argues that effective mitigation should combine registration analytics, infrastructure context, and proportional response mechanisms. It also emphasizes the importance of distinguishing maliciously registered domains from compromised legitimate domains in order to reduce false positives and avoid unnecessary harm to legitimate users. The paper concludes with a practical framework for registries, registrars, and security teams seeking to improve early detection and strengthen the security, stability, and resilience of the DNS ecosystem.
Mahdi Alshammari (Wed,) studied this question.