This study examines the impact of professional managers on audit report lag in Chinese state‐owned enterprises (SOEs). Using a novel, manually constructed dataset of A‐share listed SOEs from 2006 to 2020, we find that the presence of professional managers is associated with significantly shorter audit report lag. This relationship remains robust to various endogeneity tests, including difference‐in‐differences analysis, Heckman two‐stage estimation, and high‐dimensional fixed‐effects models. Cross‐sectional analyses reveal that the effect of professional managers is driven by improvements in the information environment, enhanced operational efficiency, and reduced audit risk. Our boundary condition analyses demonstrate that the relationship between professional managers and audit report lag is particularly pronounced in competitive SOEs, in firms with lower executive team faultlines, and when professional managers serve as CFOs. Our study contributes to the literature on SOE governance by highlighting the role of executive identity in shaping financial reporting timeliness and offers insights into the complex dynamics of China's dual‐track management system in SOEs.
Han et al. (Wed,) studied this question.