ABSTRACT This article introduces apophonic policies as a type of government failure that is rooted in the innate/cognitive human tendency to see meaningful but imaginary patterns among random data. By reviewing theories from cognitive psychology, sociology of knowledge, philosophy of science, and complexity theory, the article presents five levels of analysis (individual, group, institutional, discursive, and technological) to explain the emergence and institutionalization of apophenia in the policymaking process. Diagnostic indicators (such as the weakening of conflicting evidence, simplistic narratives, concentration of power, lack of data transparency, and the illusion of algorithmic objectivity) are introduced and operationalized in a diagnostic matrix. Four case studies, including the “War on Drugs,” the “War on Terror,” “Crime Prediction Algorithms,” and “Energiewende” illustrate the role of apophenia in producing unintended consequences and reinforcing inequality. Finally, a set of practical propositions, including polyvocality, epistemic transparency, cognitive resilience, and the human‐centricity of technology, are proposed as strategies for reducing the risks of apophenia.
Khosravi et al. (Fri,) studied this question.