Relational autonomy and consent in cases of serious harm

This article advances an original principled framework for integrating relational autonomy into English criminal law’s treatment of consent in cases of serious harm within intimate relationships - a context where relational autonomy remains doctrinally underdeveloped and normatively unarticulated in judicial reasoning. It critiques the liberal legal model’s assumption of atomistic and rational agents, demonstrating how this paradigm fails to consider the relational, contextual, and structural factors such as dependency and vulnerability, that shape individuals’ capacity to consent within intimate relationships. Through a rigorous doctrinal analysis of Martin Hobday v The King (2025), the article systematically conceptualises relational autonomy and operationalises its principles in cases of serious harm. It develops four pathways for embedding relational autonomy in judicial reasoning - contextualised consent analysis within existing precedent, incorporation of relational evidence, relational statutory interpretation, and sentencing – thereby offering a structured methodology for normative integration and principled justification for rejection of consent. This contribution addresses a critical gap in autonomy scholarship and criminal law theory by moving beyond abstract philosophical engagement to develop a coherent, actionable and principled framework for embedding relational autonomy within judicial reasoning. The article’s implications extend to other crimes and global debates on autonomy, consent, and vulnerability, positioning relational autonomy as a lens for adjudicating harm in intimate relationships.